Privatized counter-terrorist surveillance : constitutionalism undermined. by de Londras,  Fiona
  
Privatized Counter-Terrorist Surveillance: Constitutionalism Undermined 
Fiona de Londras 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is concerned with the constitutionalist challenges posed by privatized 
counter-terrorist surveillance (PCTS). PCTS is defined here as surveillance done for 
the purposes or in the course of a broader counter-terrorist regime and in which 
private (by which is meant non-state) actors are involved. This chapter characterizes 
PCTS as one illustration of a broader trend of privatization in counter-terrorism and 
problematizes it as a phenomenon that severely undermines the core constitutionalist 
commitment to limited, transparent and accountable power.  
 
The concentration here is not on the particular rights infringements or liberty 
interferences that PCTS might give rise to (such as privacy violations); nor is it on 
cataloguing the multiple ways in which law has appeared to be incapable of 
‘managing’ this phenomenon.1 Rather, this chapter takes a ‘bigger picture’ approach 
and aims to expose both the phenomenon of PCTS and its counter-constitutionalism 
for the purposes of arguing that what is required to respond appropriately to this (and 
indeed other counter-terrorist trends of concern) is not ‘more law’ per se. What is 
required is a fundamental recommitment to constitutionalism that, more than a decade 
into an intense period of transnational securitization, still appears to be lacking. 
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This chapter first outlines the general phenomenon of privatized counter-terrorism, 
which I characterize as both widespread and problematic. In the first section I identify 
four kinds of privatized counter-terrorism observable in the current context: open 
privatization, closed privatization, statutory privatization and non-contractual co-
option. While all of these are problematic in different ways, I concentrate particularly 
on closed privatization and non-contractual cooption which are both widespread in the 
surveillance context and of particular constitutionalist concern. Having outlined the 
patterns of PCTS in the third section, I go on to identify what I consider to be the core 
counter-constitutionalist dilemmas posed by PCRS: the relatively unlimited nature of 
what is considered ‘legitimate’ private power when compared with clear 
constitutionalist power limitations imposed on states, the lack of transparency and its 
attendant imperative for justification, and the accountability gaps that this gives rise 
to. These are, I argue, severe constitutionalist concerns, perhaps most particularly 
because they point to the limited capacity of law to effectively address them. 
 
2 PRIVATISED COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE CONCEPT AND 
CATEGORIES 
 
Privatization is a complex concept and has been the subject of sustained debate and 
academic attention across disciplines.
2
 Leaving the complex contestations as to the 
meaning of ‘private’ to one side, however, we can usefully concentrate here on what 
Lundqvist describes as the minimum definition of privatization, that is, moving or 
transferring something that has hitherto been within the public sector into the private 
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sector.
3
 This definition, and indeed the discussion throughout this entire chapter, 
relies on a relatively simplistic distinction between public (or governmental/state) 
actors and private (or non-state) actors which can itself be problematized. However, 
that is a task undertaken elsewhere.
4
 For the purposes of this chapter it is sufficient to 
proceed with this crude distinction, theoretically unsatisfactory as it may be, largely 
because that is how law generally distinguishes between the two.  
 
Over recent decades, it has become increasingly common for states to privatize 
functions that were traditionally undertaken by public actors. These functions range 
from the provision of health care to the regulation and provision of energy, water and 
telecommunications to matters as central to the state as the deprivation of liberty by 
means of imprisonment. Counter-terrorism has not escaped this trend. Across a wide 
range of counter-terrorist activity we can see the involvement of private (largely but 
not exclusively) corporate actors such as private security companies, aviation and 
other logistics enterprises, and central banks. When we remind ourselves that states 
are essentially involved in both providing for their people and producing services, and 
that security is one such (if not the core) service the state provides and produces, this 
privatization of counter-terrorism was perhaps inevitable. 
 
Kolderie has identified three dimensions across which privatization generally occurs: 
(1) government decides to provide something but involves a non-state actor in 
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production of the services required for such provision; (2) a non-state actor decides to 
provide something and enlists government in producing the required services; or (3) 
both the decision to provide and the production of the required services are taken by a 
non-state actor.
5
 He goes on to illustrate these three dimensions in the context of 
security by pointing to instances where government decides to provide security at an 
event and then contracts with a private corporation to actually produce the security 
(evoking (1) above), or a private actor decides that security is required for an event 
and then engages with the government for it to be produced by state actors (evoking 
(2) above), or a private actor decides that it wants to provide security and contracts 
with a private corporation for that security to be produced (evoking (3) above).
6
  
 
We also observe these three dimensions in the more acute security scenario of 
counter-terrorism. Take, for example, the enlisting of central banks and transaction 
tracking companies in the implementation of legal frameworks for the disruption of 
terrorist financing (referring to scenario (1) above),
7
 or the enlisting of the military 
(including the placement of weaponry on residential buildings) to provide security for 
the London Olympics (scenario (2) above),
8
 or the engagement by private companies 
of private security firms and technology to protect against cyber-terrorism (scenario 
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(3) above).
9
 As contemporary counter-terrorism is essentially an exercise oriented 
towards the provision and production of the public good of security, the use of 
privatization across these three dimensions as part of counter-terrorism is something 
by which we ought perhaps not to be surprised. That this privatization would take 
place also in the context of surveillance – to which we shortly turn in a more 
sustained manner – is indicated by the hyper-connected nature of the modern world in 
which the networked realities of open and easy to access technologies such as the 
internet and cell phones create security risks and realities that states might most 
efficiently tackle by means of the involvement of private actors. 
 
Building on these general observations about the concept and nature of privatization, 
this chapter classifies privatization in the counter-terrorist context across four 
different types. These are not unique to surveillance but rather reflect the broader 
phenomenon of privatized counter-terrorism. First, ‘open’ privatization by means of 
out-sourcing grounded in open contracts, which are declared and can be subjected to 
public critique and analysis. Secondly, ‘closed’ privatization by means of out-
sourcing grounded in closed contracts, where the existence of either the out-sourcing 
relationship or the content of the contract is not disclosed and is not subject to public 
critique and analysis. The frequency with which these kinds of contracts arise is not 
known, but we do know that they exist in at least some counter-terrorist contexts such 
as for logistics support in extraordinary rendition.
10
 Thirdly, statutory privatization, 
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where legislative obligations are placed on non-state actors to engage in relatively 
specific activities that feed into broader state-run counter-terrorist strategies and 
policies. Placing asset freezing obligations on banks is a common example of this in 
the counter-terrorist context. Fourthly, non-contractual co-option, where non-state 
actors are ‘co-opted’ into counter-terrorism in an informal, networked manner without 
any clear outline of the parameters of the co-option or, indeed, publicization of the 
fact of the co-operation, co-option and counter-terrorist activities of the non-state 
actor involved. The original arrangement between the Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and American intelligence agencies 
relating to transaction tracking is a well-known example of this.
11
  
 
This chapter will not examine open and legislative privatization in any detail. This is 
not to suggest that these types of privatization are not sites of concern, but in 
recognition of the fact that – from a constitutionalist perspective – they are of 
relatively less concern than are closed privatization and non-contractual co-option.  
Open privatization raises a low level of constitutionalist concern because the 
existence and general content of the contract is known and can be challenged. Not 
only is the information required to challenge open privatization publicly available but 
rights-related structures applicable to the content and processes of such privatization 
exist. It is clear that under international human rights law states have an obligation to 
take into account their international obligations in the crafting of privatization 
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decisions and contracts.
12
 Furthermore, in domestic law there will often be some 
mechanism in place by which ‘private’ actors undertaking work on behalf of the state 
can be held to account in an analogous manner to governmental actors. Section 6 of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) and the constitutional state action doctrine in the 
United States (US) spring immediately to mind.
13
  
 
Statutory privatization is also relatively unproblematic from a constitutionalist 
perspective. This is because the statutes in question will be subject to the same 
constitutionalist limitations on legitimate statutory activity as is all legislation. Thus, 
for example, the mere fact of privatization might be challenged as an unlawful 
delegation of state authority, the content of the privatized obligation might be 
subjected to scrutiny for compliance with constitutional or statutory human rights 
guarantees, and some mechanism of accountability (whether judicial, administrative 
of parliamentary) is likely to be built into the overall legislative framework.  
 
This is not to suggest that these mechanisms of privatization are entirely 
unproblematic; rather that they are relatively less problematic than closed and non-
contractual co-option. This chapter will concentrate on the latter only. Non-
contractual co-option can be frequently observed in the context of counter-terrorist 
surveillance. It is not clear to what extent, if any, closed privatization arises in this 
context.  
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3 SURVEILLANCE: COUNTER-TERRORISM EVERYWHERE 
 
PCTS is an exercise by the state in harnessing immense amounts of privately owned 
and developed technological awareness and capacity and using that technology to do, 
through or with the assistance of private actors, what is traditionally done by the state, 
that is, to survey individual actors’ movements and activities for security-related 
purposes. By harnessing this private capacity, the state can undertake counter-terrorist 
surveillance without either clearly adhering to the normal legal limitations to which 
the state is subject and/or without us being wholly aware of the extent to which our 
interactions with prima facie private actors, and in apparently private spaces, 
constitute proxy interactions with the state and in the public.  
 
A relatively brief sketch of the extent of PCTS illustrates how the state can and does 
conduct counter-terrorist surveillance ‘everywhere’ by means of this privatization. 
The enormous private surveillance infrastructure that now exists includes both 
technologies that are expressly or manifestly concerned with surveillance and those 
which have surveillance capacity. These encompass a range of technologies from 
Closed Circuit Television systems (CCTV), to mobile phone and Global Positioning 
Systems (GPS) location capacities and internet search engines (all of which have 
counter-terrorist surveillance potential).  
 
CCTV systems are incredibly prevalent both inside and outside commercial and 
private premises. They make the concept of going about one’s business in some kind 
of privacy almost impossible to realise. Footage recorded on these cameras – for 
  
which there is rarely any kind of permit required – can be and regularly is 
appropriated by states for multiple purposes: traffic control, crime control, 
investigation and so on. Identification through the use of CCTV footage can be 
remarkably swift and easy, especially if the state in question happens to have an 
extensive photographic database. A recent trend whereby police forces place 
photographs taken through CCTV cameras on social media sites, such as Twitter and 
Facebook, and seek ‘leads’ on identifying the individuals featured in these 
photographs adds a further layer of privatization to the use of CCTV and, indeed, the 
privatization of security and surveillance more generally.  
 
Mobile phones also carry enormous surveillance potential. Making a phone call, 
sending a text message, or checking your email on your phone can allow for your 
exact location (or at least the exact location of the mobile phone in question) at that 
particular time to be identified and for this then to be fed into investigative and 
surveillance processes. In some newer phones, including the iPhone, ‘location’ 
settings that allow for the careless among us to identify where our phone is when it is 
lost or mislaid also allow for it to be traced when it is not, and even when no use is 
being made of the phone. The location information can be acquired by the state from 
the mobile phone operator, often through satisfying a far lower test than would be the 
case if that state wanted to survey us itself. Again, we are not always aware of the 
degree to which our everyday engagement with technology – ‘checking in’ on 
Facebook, using GPS on the phone to measure the length and average pace of our 
morning run, sending a quick text message to tell a loved one that we have arrived 
safely at our destination – opens the opportunity for the state to perform its 
sovereignty on us through the engagement of private actors. That sovereign 
  
performance is invisible, at least until it becomes corporeally written upon us perhaps 
by being charged with a criminal offence or placed at the scene of a crime. The 
banality of it – the commonplace nature of our use of technology and the high 
penetration of mobile phones into even the most remote markets – makes it virtually 
invisible to those of us not specifically ‘tuned in’ to these kinds of uses of technology.  
 
In the context of mobile phone and internet technology, we see very clear patterns of 
co-option of private or non-governmental actors in the context of counter-terrorist 
surveillance not only in terms of location data but also in terms of helping the state to 
monitor people’s phone and internet usage without formal contractual or statutory 
agreements or obligations to do so. This is aptly illustrated by the so called 
‘President’s Surveillance Programme’ (the Programme) in the US. The Programme 
involved numerous telecommunications carriers both intercepting and disclosing to 
the government enormous amounts of information about contemporaneous 
telecommunications as well as telecommunications records.
14
 This went well beyond 
the publicly disclosed interception of communications into and out of the US where 
there was a reasonable basis for concluding that at least one of the communicating 
parties was involved in or associated with terrorist organisations.
15
 The exact scope of 
the involvement of telecommunications firms in the Programme is not conclusively 
known as the US Supreme Court denied certiorari in a suit relating to same.
16
 But 
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there is no doubt that communications were intercepted and diverted and 
communication histories handed over to the government by private entities in a 
massive surveillance operation without the knowledge of the individuals who were 
subjected to it. 
 
The enormity and accessibility of the internet makes it a technology of great interest 
and utility to criminals generally and to terrorist organisations in particular. It can be 
manipulated towards such nefarious ends as recruiting potential terrorists, 
propagandizing terrorist activities and messages, communication (both specific and 
general), fund raising and cyber-terrorism. States are and have long been concerned 
with the capacity of the internet to offer a large and sophisticated platform for terrorist 
activity. The very nature of the internet – as a trans-jurisdictional phenomenon and 
technology – makes it difficult to control. Internet-related counter-terrorism is 
complex because it cuts across all three categories of internet governance issues as 
defined by Dutton and Peltu: internet centric issues, internet-user centric issues, and 
non-internet centric issues.
17
 The first set of issues relates to the maintenance of 
efficient and reliable internet and requires, among other things, high adaptation 
capacity so that the internet can maintain functionality even while technology and 
other changes are impacting upon it. The second relates more specifically to internet-
user behaviours particularly where the internet is ‘misused’, that is, used for illegal 
and/or ‘inappropriate’ activity. The third highlights the relationship between internet 
governance and broader socio-political concerns and policy areas. In the counter-
terrorist context, we are concerned with, for example, the security of internet 
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infrastructure from cyber-attack (internet centric), the use of websites and online fora 
to recruit potential terrorists (internet-user centric) and the mechanisms by which the 
internet connects (constructively and destructively) with broader politico-legal 
counter-terrorist infrastructure (non-internet-centric). In relation to all of these, some 
kind of engagement between state and non-state actors in internet surveillance can be 
discerned. 
 
In trying to regulate the internet for counter-terrorist purposes, states are performing 
sovereignty: they are extending their power extra-jurisdictionally and infringing on 
individual liberties for the purposes of expressing their supremacy over terrorist 
organisations in the online terrain. Doing this involves states in trying to achieve a 
number of things including, but not limited, to ‘seeing’ suspect communications, 
tracking browsing histories and patterns, using geo-location technology to identify the 
location of particular users and removing material that is considered to glorify 
terrorism. These may be pursued through surveillance activities with which – as 
internet users – we might not be particularly comfortable, such as using keystroke 
technology to record every keystroke on a particular machine in order to ‘read’ 
written communications and record passwords. Other activities undertaken as part of 
counter-terrorist internet governance implicate governments in data mining and 
profiling processes that have high discriminatory potential, for example, recording the 
education, communications, financial affairs, medical history, travel, immigration, 
transportation and housing affairs undertaken online. Once more, we see here the non-
contractual co-option of private actors in counter-terrorism by the ‘nudging’ of ISPs, 
major search engine operators and other online entities to record and report 
information about people’s online activities. A few examples might be Google’s 
  
willingness to hand information about search and browser histories over to the 
authorities, agreement by search engines to either remove certain sites from their 
results or to privilege other sites when particular terms are used, and agreements by 
ISPs to filter out certain kinds of sites and content and, indeed, to remove content, 
including that which is identified as glorifying terrorism. 
 
We are often entirely unaware of the extent to which our online lives are surveyed and 
made available as matters of public record when requested by states; statutes 
permitting for states to acquire information on online data are far from rare
18
 and 
governments frequently moot more;
19
 even where such statutes exist, they are 
sometimes circumvented by surveillance done without lawful authority or the 
cooperative handing over of data by private companies such as the notorious 
warrantless wiretap programme in the United States. Thus, internet service providers, 
search engines, social networking sites and other organizations have been co-opted 
into the state’s counter-terrorist activities (because they are used to track our activity 
or because they hand information to governments) and we have all become subjects of 
counter-terrorism without necessarily perceiving our subjectivity in this way. This is 
not only part of what Simon Chesterman has documented as a new social contract 
with the surveillance state,
20
 but also an example of pervasive privatization in the 
counter-terrorism context with serious constitutionalist implications. 
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4 CONSTITUTIONALIST IMPLICATIONS OF ‘PRIVATE’ COUNTER-
TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE 
 
PCTS has at least two serious implications for constitutionalism, where 
constitutionalism is considered in a textured sense as a commitment to power being 
limited, transparent and accountable and where that commitment is given effect by 
legal, constitutional and organizational structures within the state. Across all three of 
these parameters – limitation of power, transparency in the exercise of power, and 
accountability for the exercise of power – PCTS is problematic. Although considered 
separately below, it is important to note that limitation, transparency and 
accountability are closely connected constitutionalist concepts. This is because the 
transparency of the exercise of power creates the impetus towards explaining that 
exercise and the possibility of being judged and held accountable for what is 
considered to be an unacceptable exercise of power. Those judgments become the 
mechanisms by which we outline the limits on the exercise of power.  
 
4.1 Limitation of Power 
 
It is trite to observe that our organization into politico-legal entities known as states 
represents a handing over by ‘the people’ of some power to the state to coerce and 
regulate our activity. This does not, however, mean that we hand absolute power to 
the state. Rather, we agree – whether conceptualized through the classical ‘social 
contract’ lens or not – that the state may exercise power over us within what we have 
defined as acceptable limits. In states that embrace legal constitutionalism, those 
  
limits are commonly clearly delineated in written constitutions which, in turn, are 
enforced by courts. In states that embrace political constitutionalism, the limits may 
be less clear and more difficult to identify but, at a minimum, they reside in the 
common law civil liberties and the principles of natural justice expressed in judicial 
review. In both cases, it is clear that power is not unlimited. This is so even in 
classically political constitutions such as that found in the United Kingdom (UK).
21
  
 
It is a core element of constitutionalism that the state will not act beyond those agreed 
limitations. To do so – to infringe upon our fundamental liberties by means of such 
extension – would be to rupture fundamentally the bond between the people and the 
state and call into question the legitimacy of the state’s exercise of power. In this 
respect, of course, legitimacy must be unhitched from the concept of legality for this 
to be a matter of particularly serious concern. A wholly legalistic conceptualization of 
legitimacy may result in one having less constitutionalist discomfort with such 
applications of power provided they were pursuant to laws promulgated in a 
procedurally correct manner or an alleged executive power exercisable without any 
such legislative measure.  
 
Surveillance by the state infringes on numerous of our freedoms, particularly 
expression, association and privacy.
22
 However, when the state engages directly in 
acts of surveillance it must do so within agreed limits – procedural and substantive – 
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that delineate acceptable and unacceptable interferences with these freedoms. The 
same is not true of private entities, with which we do not have any kind of comparable 
‘bargain’. Indeed, we arguably give to these entities large amounts of our privacy and 
personal freedoms by our use of their services and agreement to their terms and 
conditions. Thus, these private entities may be empowered to infringe to a greater 
extent than states on our freedoms by gathering information about users. States 
manage, by means of non-contractual co-option, to ‘piggy-back’ on that infringement 
and benefit from it by receiving and processing the extensive information thus 
gathered. This may not constitute a ‘hard’ expansion of state power beyond the agreed 
limits (inasmuch as the state is not directly exercising the surveillance power). But, by 
any account, it is a de facto interference with personal liberties outside of those 
accepted limitations and is thus of constitutionalist concern.  
 
4.2  Transparent Exercise of Power 
 
It is not only fundamental that states would limit their exercises of power to accepted 
limits but also that such power would be transparently exercised. This does not mean 
– as, indeed, it realistically could not mean, given practical considerations – that the 
state must be absolutely transparent and open about every individual exercise of 
power upon an individual. It is, of course, the case that individual surveillance 
patterns and decisions must remain confidential for security reasons (although this 
does not preclude ex post facto disclosure and analysis). However, a constitutionalist 
commitment to transparency requires the disclosure of patterns of state surveillance 
which are all too often missing in the context of PCTS. Thus, while we do not (and 
should not) expect the state to write to us individually and tell us that our email 
  
correspondence is being read and fed into a data processing system for counter-
terrorist reasons, it is legitimate for us to expect that the fact that the state has 
partnerships with private entities (such as CCTV operators, ISPs, Facebook and so 
on) would be disclosed to us. This is important for two reasons. 
 
The first is that we are entitled to expect that we can appreciate the situations in which 
we are interacting with the state and allow knowledge of that interaction to regulate 
our behaviours. When we interact with an entity that is manifestly identified as the 
state – such as, for example, asking a uniformed police officer whether she has any 
hints or tips about how one might make a bomb – we are immediately aware of the 
fact that we are engaged with the state. In this example, the questioner should 
reasonably expect that the police would take an interest in his or her activities. 
However, would such an expectation exist if the person in question typed ‘how to 
make a bomb’ into a search engine rather than asking a police officer? Here, there is 
no clear expectation or indication that one’s curiosity about such an activity would 
arouse state suspicions. It may well be that we would like to know when people are, 
in fact, seeking information of this kind; we might think it quite advisable that such a 
search term would trigger a reporting obligation on the part of the search engine 
provider to the state. However, this is not incompatible with saying that we expect to 
know when our activities invite (or potentially invite) the attention of the state, 
especially when our immediate interlocutor looks nothing like the state and 
everything like a corporate actor.  
 
The second reason why transparency is important from a constitutionalist perspective 
is more theoretical. Adopting the Arendtian commitment to the public helps us to see 
  
the constitutionalist value of transparency.
23
 For Arendt, ‘public’ is that which is 
subject to the public gaze and, as a result, in relation to which there is an imperative 
for justification and a possibility of judgment. This, in turn, of course, ought to 
catalyze a reflective ex ante process where the justifiability of the activity is 
considered before it is undertaken. Ideally this would mean that power remains within 
agreed-upon limits.  
 
PCTS is problematic from this perspective because its covert nature means that the 
fact that it is being done to us might not be known at the time or, indeed, ever. 
Concealment of coercive, counter-terrorist and regulatory activity is a matter of 
concern to the Arendtian because actions done beyond the public gaze are not open to 
judgement and are therefore not subject to the imperative for justification. That 
relationship – between the possibility of being judged and the attendant requirement 
of justification – is, in a way, a philosophical writing of the basic constitutionalist 
principle that power should be transparent, accountable and limited.  
 
4.3 Accountability for the Exercise of Power 
 
Accountability is a rightly lauded concept in the context of constitutionalism, and 
public law and organization more broadly. Although the concept of accountability is a 
complex one, for our purposes it is sufficient to subscribe broadly to Bovens’ classical 
articulation of accountability as both a virtue and a mechanism.
24
 As a virtue, 
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accountability encompasses the behavioural commitment to acting in a manner that 
accepts – if not embraces – the submission of one’s actions to scrutiny, accepting that 
there are limits (either substantive or procedural) on the permissible exercise of 
power. As a mechanism, accountability describes the means by which an actor is 
required to give an account of her actions to a forum which has the capacity to put in 
place some kind of consequence (whether that be a sanction or not) for the 
misapplication or maladministration of power. Understood thus, it is clear that there is 
at least some connectivity between accountability as a virtue and accountability as a 
mechanism. That is, in the absence of a mechanism for ‘making one accountable’, one 
might question the incentives for ‘acting accountably’, particularly in a situation of 
particular strain such as a perceived or actual security crisis.  
 
Accountability is lauded and valued because it is a key mechanism for ensuring that 
the bargain struck with the state (that it will exercise power only within the limits set 
for it as considered above) is adhered to. Furthermore, it is a largely successful means 
of ensuring transparency—or of acting in Arendt’s public gaze—which brings with it 
the imperative for justification and the possibility of judgment already considered. 
Accountability  thus improves governance, provides opportunities for public catharsis, 
and bolsters constitutionalism. The importance of accountability to constitutionalism 
is illustrated by the attention that states have historically paid to establishing 
mechanisms for its achievement. Open parliamentary processes (including 
committees and parliamentary inquiries), elections, judicial review, a free press, and 
structures of bureaucratic organization are all mechanisms designed to both 
incentivize accountable behavior in the first place and ensure the discovery of 
unacceptable behaviours.  
  
 
PCTS challenges accountability because it involves entities not normally subject to 
our core accountability mechanisms in behaviours with clear constitutionalist and 
liberty implications but leaves them outside of accountability structures. Even where 
contracts of some kind are used to bring private actors into security activities, there 
are difficulties with establishing clear legal rationales for subjecting them to 
conventional accountability structures and mechanisms:
25
the contracting party 
remains private and thus not subject—in our conventional understanding—to the 
same accountability structures as public actors are. The law frequently allows the 
‘private’ actor to simply be treated as a contracting party governed by contract law 
and not as what it is in PCTS contexts: a differently constructed manifestation of state 
power. If the arrangement passes a test for treatment as a proxy state actor—such as 
the state action test in the United States or the hybrid public authority test under s.6 of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 in the UK—public accountability systems can be 
imposed, but these are difficult to establish
26
 and in numerous contexts contractual 
context has been determinative.
27
  They can also be frustrated by the invocation of 
strong immunity claims such as state secrets, or indeed by judicial deference to the 
security context.  
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  See, eg, Mohammed v Jeppeson Dataplan Inc 614 F 3d 1070, 1075-6 (9
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 Cir 2010), denying 
certiorari, albeit in the context of logistics provision this case illustrates the capacity of the state to 
deploy state secrets to prevent discovery of such contracts.  
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 For a general discussion see D Barak-Erez, ‘A state action doctrine for an age of privatization’ 
(1994) 45 Syracuse Law Review 1169. 
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 For example YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27. 
 
  
In the absence of any contractual nexus with the state – such as in the case of non-
contractual co-option – accountability can be even more difficult to achieve. This is 
not least because of the apparent ease with which states can insulate these actors from 
a key legal accountability mechanism for private entities (liability) by blocking 
discovery through invocation of doctrines such as state secrets.
28
 Although some 
accountability mechanisms beyond law can flow where the involvement of private 
actors is discovered (such as market-based accountability, inquiries or being required 
to appear before a parliamentary committee), these are likely to apply only on an ad 
hoc and somewhat haphazard basis. They are insufficiently systematic to act as an 
effective regulator of private entities’ involvement in counter-terrorist surveillance or 
of states’ use of PCTS.  
 
5 LAW IS ALL WE NEED? 
 
Seen in isolation, PCTS may not seem to be something to which we need give an 
inordinate amount of attention. After all, as infringements on liberties in the context 
of counter-terrorism go, it is, perhaps, not the matter of the most pressing concern. 
One might also imagine that a fairly comprehensive regulatory framework – either 
legal or voluntary – might be introduced that would remedy at least some of the 
constitutionalist concerns that are raised above. However, there is a need here to 
recognize PCTS as a microcosmic illustration of three contemporary trends. These 
trends converge in this context to establish that what is lacking is not law per se but 
rather a commitment to constitutionalism in contemporary counter-terrorism.  
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The first of these trends is the emergence of a counter-terrorist state in which counter-
terrorism and security have become a dominating grammar informing and shaping 
swathes of state activity, policy making, resource allocation and political debate. In 
spite of the fact that more than a decade has passed since the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001, that day remains a significant moment on the US and international 
political landscapes. This is so in terms of both the reams of law and policy 
introduced at the national, transnational and international levels in response (direct or 
indirect) to the attacks and its status as a signal event recalled in politics and popular 
culture with almost ritualistic frequency when new repressive laws, policies and 
practices are under discussion. In many facets of the ‘war on terrorism’ that emerged 
in the wake of these attacks, a counter-constitutionalist turn has been evident in liberal 
democracies such as the US, Canada, the UK and Australia of which the growth and 
adoption of PCTS is only a part. The core constitutionalist commitment to limited, 
transparent and accountable power is increasingly made vulnerable by reference to 
necessity, extraordinariness, risk and the need for secrecy. These concepts act as 
barriers to deliberation and to constitutionalist caution, creating the politico-legal 
space within which states can and do undertake expansive and repressive counter-
terrorist activities, including counter-terrorist surveillance, with seemingly minimal 
concern for the constitutionalist implications thereof not just in strict legal terms but 
also from a broader perspective of commitment to the core pillars of constitutionalist 
democracy.
29
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That this would – to at least some extent – involve the state in privatizing some of its 
counter-terrorist work ought not, perhaps, to be surprising given the decades-long 
pattern of contracting out, privatizing and co-option that can be observed across a 
wide swathe of traditional state activity. The state has steadily been engaged in a 
Janus-faced evolution whereby it appears to shrink (by the delegating of tasks and 
powers to non-state actors) but functionally expands (by the executing of state policy 
and concerns by these non-state actors) and the counter-terrorist context has not 
escaped this trend. In all of its manifestations, this pattern raises constitutionalist 
concerns. This is no less true of PCTS in which the concerns relate both to the core 
commitments of constitutionalism outlined above and individual rights protection.
30
  
 
It should be noted that even were the state not to utilize PCTS to the extent considered 
above, the breadth of surveillance activities undertaken in the name of counter-
terrorism – not to mention their covertness – ought still to be a matter of concern. As 
is outlined throughout this volume, surveillance is ever-expanding. Driven by and 
driving technological advances that subject human behaviors to automated and 
algorithmic analyses which can have serious implications for individual liberty, 
surveillance as a contemporary activity raises profound questions about law’s 
capacity to contend with such technological advances in a manner that effectively 
protects individual liberties and reinforces the state’s bounded power.31  
 
Placed in the febrile context of counter-terrorism these difficulties are exacerbated, 
but fundamentally – in this context as in others – they are manageable. Although a 
significant and difficult task, legal innovation to ensure that rules and frameworks can 
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be developed to manage surveillance techniques, even as they become more 
technologically sophisticated, is by no means beyond the ability of jurisprudes, 
legislators and courts. What is absent, rather, is the core commitment to 
constitutionalist principles that is required as a foundation for the development, 
adoption and implementation of those rules and frameworks.  
 
The purpose of this chapter has not been to illustrate a phenomenon with which law 
cannot contend; by a combination of innovations in public (including constitutional), 
private (including contract and data protection) and administrative law the 
phenomenon of PCTS could easily be brought under legal control. However, this 
requires a recommitment to core constitutionalist principles of limited, transparent 
and accountable power that are systematically undermined by privatized counter-
terrorist surveillance. It is that recommitment that has so far proved to be lacking. 
